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Cooling out the Marks: The Ideology and Politics of the Financial Crisis 


In the argot of the criminal world, the term "mark" refers to any individual who is a victim or prospective victim of certain forms of planned illegal exploitation. The mark is the sucker ‑ the person who is taken in… 

The potential sucker is…. given an opportunity to invest his money in a gambling venture which he understands to have been fixed in his favor. The venture, of course, is fixed, but not in his favor. The mark is permitted to win some money and then persuaded to invest more. There is an "accident" or "mistake", and the mark loses his total investment. The operators then depart in a ceremony that is called the blowoff or sting. They leave the mark but take his money. The mark is expected to go on his way, a little wiser and a lot poorer. 

Sometimes, however, a mark is not quite prepared to accept his loss as a gain in experience and to say and do nothing about his venture. He may feel moved to complain to the police or to chase after the operators. In the terminology of the trade, the mark may squawk, beef, or come through. From the operators' point of view, this kind of behaviour is bad for business. It gives the members of the mob a bad reputation with such police as have not yet been fixed and with marks who have not yet been taken. In order to avoid this adverse publicity, an additional phase is sometimes added at the end of the play. It is called cooling the mark out. After the blowoff has occurred, one of the operators stays with the mark and makes an effort to keep the anger of the mark within manageable and sensible proportions. The operator stays behind his team‑mates in the capacity of what might be called a cooler and exercises upon the mark the art of consolation. An attempt is made to define the situation for the mark in a way that makes it easy for him to accept the inevitable and quietly go home. The mark is given instruction in the philosophy of taking a loss.










All major economic crises leave deep scars, in terms of long-term unemployment, wage stagnation, attenuated public services, and so on. When it comes to estimating the costs of the financial crisis of 2007-, figures associated with the bailout of the banks hit the headlines. In the UK, these range anywhere from £800 billion to a few billion, depending on what value the government eventually secures for the sale of its bank shares. But the bailout figures are dwarfed by official estimates of the total cost to the British economy of the banking crisis. Figures here range from £1.7 trillion to £9 trillion but are rarely headlined in the media (Andy Haldane, Executive Director of Bank of England, quoted on BBC 4 2010, December 24). To put this into context, these amounts could finance the UK’s total annual spend for anywhere between two to twelve years.

Much ink has been spilt analysing the causes and pathways leading to the current financial crisis. Yet comparatively little attention has been given to media and policy responses to its costly effects, and, more specifically, how the ‘marks’ – in this case, UK citizens, have been ‘cooled out’ (Goffman, 1952, see epigraph). During the extended boom that preceded the meltdown, the `marks’ had placed their trust, consciously or unconsciously, in the mechanisms of the financial system. The boom was fuelled by low global interest rates resulting from the supply of high levels of global liquidity by the saving nations such as China which, in turn, propelled a seemingly endless rise in asset prices, notably in property (Barell and Davis, 2008).  Those who took out loans either to purchase products or assets or to remortgage their assets were readily, and even enthusiastically, ‘taken in’ (Goffman, 1952: 451). 

Then it happened: the Big Crunch. This paper addresses the public reaction to the crisis precipitated by the ‘crunch’ and its effects, in particular the comparatively muted response to it (so far). Of course, there has been a lot of ‘squawking’ (Goffman, 1952: 451). Shrill expressions of public dismay, anger, and complaint abound, especially in relation to `greedy bankers’. Yet this dismay has rarely (as yet) translated into organized mass demonstrations and sustained political demands. In giving evidence to the Treasury Select Committee in 2011 the Governor of the Bank of England himself expressed surprise at the relative lack of concerted public mobilization around this issue (The Guardian, 1 March 2011; The Daily Telegraph, 4 March 2011). So, how, to date, has the widespread anger and dismay been channelled and contained? Why have the norms of the finance regime not been more widely or persistently challenged? What can account for the limited scope and depth of public protest and debate in a developed democracy such as the UK? 

To address these questions,  we engage Goffman’s classic piece ‘On Cooling the Mark Out’ and we adopt a ‘logics approach’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007) to analyse the sequence of events suggested by Goffman. In deploying Goffman’s 	`Cooling’ to frame our argument, we recognise that the parallels are significant but not perfect. The most important difference is that the markes of the financial crisis had limited awareness of their participation in a `gambling venture’; and, of course, most of the financial dealings were entirely legal.  The logics approach seeks to interrogate and critique social realities construed as a nexus of social, political, and fantasmatic logics. A distinctive feature of this framework, particularly the fantasmatic aspect, is how it foregrounds the centrality of the affective dimension of practices –  such as our emotional investment in ventures that promise rich rewards, or the enjoyment derived from viewing the compelling TV coverage of ex-Lehman Brothers employees emerging from the Canary Wharf offices carrying their possessions in cardboard boxes​[1]​ Our aim is to show how key logics in media and policy responses to the financial crisis have operated to marginalize public contestation and narrow down public debate about how to avoid, or even limit the possibility, of a future financial meltdown. 


2. The Logics Framework 


The logics framework draws on a poststructuralist tradition of thought that posits structures as ontologically incomplete entities, affirming thereby the radical contingency of social objectivity. From this perspective, a key aspect of analysing social practices as a function of logics involves appreciating how practices are animated by incomplete structures on the one hand, and by the collective acts of identification that sustain or transform those incomplete structures, on the other (Glynos, 2008: 277; Glynos & Howarth, 2007). While the radical contingency of social reality might become more clearly visible in moments of crisis and dislocation, it does not follow that structural transformation ensues. The nexus of logics is conceived as a way of analysing the constructed and political character of practices, including the manner in which the status quo is protected, challenged, and defended.​[2]​

The ontological incompleteness of social objectivities has significant implications for the analysis of practices, including financial practices. All three logics deployed in our explanatory framework (social, political and fantasmatic logics) are understood to retain a relation to this basic premise, and for this reason are invested with an ontological import that exceeds their empirical instantiations. Think, for example, of the practices of teaching, cooking, journalism, or indeed finance. All such practices are governed through a mix of actions, norms and more or less shared meanings; and, in characterizing them, we may point to any number of processes: managerial, pedagogic, dialogic, deliberative, moral, technological, economic, and so on. Insofar as such processes are judged to contribute to the identity of a practice by enabling its self-reproduction, we could say that these processes comprise social logics. If one important manifestation of the ontological incompleteness of social objectivities is the public contestation of norms governing practices, then we could say that social logics refer to those processes and aspects of a practice for which the question of a norm’s contestability does not even arise. In short, social logics characterize the patterning of established practices by dominant organizing principles. Financial practices are of course replete with a whole range of managerial, technological, and economic norms and processes. However, insofar as these processes are not put into question in the mode of public contestation, they would be qualified as ‘social’ in our approach. Such financial logics are qualified as social logics insofar as they comprise naturalised forms of risk-taking, financial innovation, financial engineering, shareholder value maximization, proceduralized governance, turnover-related bonus pools, and so on. One prominent social logic animating a neoliberal regime of finance, for example, might be considered to be the logic of risk dispersal, associated with processes of securitization and financial derivatives.

Political logics, in contrast, attend to processes of institutionalization, contestation, restoration or de-institutionalization. Political logics can operate so as to embed, challenge, disrupt, displace, reaffirm, consolidate, or restore social logics. Political logics can be mobilized under conditions of crisis, giving rise to a moment when, in Lacanian terms, the Real intrudes and ‘a sense emerges, however, localized or diffuse this may be, that “things are not quite right”’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 143). A dramatic example of such a moment occurred on the 14th September 2007 when lengthy queues formed outside branches of Northern Rock, the UK’s 8th largest high street bank. Media coverage of the queues signalled the first run on a UK bank in over 100 years​[3]​ and this spectacle presented the first public indication of a problem in the financial system. To more knowledgeable observers the queues indexed the intrusion of a dislocatory moment (seizure in the wholesale money markets) that was, potentially, terminal for other financial institutions (Sorkin, 2010). At such moments of de-naturalization, political logics are, in principle, more readily mobilized to contest the way social relations, such as those comprising the banking system, are organized.

Importantly, however, political logics may operate just as easily and no less effectively to pre-empt contestation or indeed to restore social logics and norms that are being challenged. One way of appreciating this variety is to appreciate how the term ‘political’ can take on slightly different values depending on what it qualifies. Consider the following three qualifications: political ‘moment’, political ‘dimension’, and political ‘logics’. While there is a family resemblance that cuts across these instances of qualification, there are also differences that can be put to illuminating analytical use. In a first sweep, we could say that the political ‘moment’ aims to capture the always-present potential for public contestation and/or collective mobilization and intervention. The political moment thus bears a clear relation to the radical contingency of the social order. What we think is particularly helpful in the context of this paper, however, is the distinction we can draw between ‘dimension’ and ‘logics’ (see Glynos & Howarth 2007). These terms also bear a relation to the radical contingency of the social order. The political dimension is tied to the idea of public contestation. The bailout option, for example, might be publicly contested on account of the ‘moral hazard’ it presents. However, political logics are here conceived to convey something about how logics of signification are enacted in and through various processes of collective mobilization and intervention, whether there is public contestation or not. (By logics of signification here we mean simply the way discursive elements enter into relations of equivalence or relations of difference.) This means that political logics can be qualified as pre-emptive or indeed restorative, insofar as they operate to make less likely the emergence of the political dimension. It has been noted for example how ‘many management and governance techniques’ function to ‘pre-emptively absorb dislocations’ (ibid: 146). As we will see in the analysis that follows, various news and official reports on the banking crisis, as well as key institutional devices, such as UK Finanical Investments Ltd (UKFI), can be said to articulate just such pre-emptive and restorative political logics. What remains the case, however, is that whether it is in the mode of contestation, pre-emption or restoration, we see how the qualification ‘political’ carries with it ontological import – it does so because it is closely tied to the idea of radical contingency of the social order.


We turn, finally, to fantasmatic logics, which are understood to provide both social and political logics with their force or `grip’ (Glynos, 2001). They make political logics compelling and they make social logics natural. Fantasmatic logics attend to the role of subjectivity, desire and enjoyment (jouissance) in establishing, sustaining, challenging or restoring social realities. Fantasies, as Žižek puts it, are ‘the support that gives consistency to what we call “reality”’ (1989: 44). It does so by structuring our desire and the enjoyment this makes possible. Insofar as fantasies deny or obfuscate contingency, they exert an ideological effect that is of immense importance for sustaining social logics in the face of their prospective challenge and potential dislocation. Conversely, they may energize political logics of transformation, pre-emption, or restoration.​[4]​ Ideology, from this perspective, does not reside in ‘false consciousness’ - in the sense of a misrecognition of the true essence of structure or identity. Rather, it resides in ‘the non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the impossibility of any ultimate suture’ (Laclau 1990, p. 92). In Lacanian terms, ideology relies heavily upon the fantasies that structure the reality of our social relations through our desires and modes of enjoyment in ways that enable us to ignore or avoid rather than confront contingency and incompleteness.


Fantasmatic logics are here conceived as responsive to desires animated by an impulse to recapture a primordial enjoyment, or jouissance, that is sacrificed upon the entry into the symbolic realm of language. This ontological sacrifice directly correlates with the poststructuralist premise that symbolic structures are inherently incomplete, which implies that the political moment is always-present as a potential moment of contestation and mobilization. The ontological sacrifice of enjoyment is routinely unacknowledged as it is projected onto others and ascribed the status of ‘stolen’. In fact, the notion of ‘theft of enjoyment’ is a very powerful motif in the way subjects structure their desire and often informs various scapegoating tendencies. The operation of fantasmatic logics frequently articulates a fullness-to-come which anticipates a recuperation of the primordial enjoyment that will follow the overcoming of an obstacle or the removal of a villain held responsible for the theft of ‘our’ jouissance (e.g. the `greedy’, `reckless’ bankers). The financial crisis is interesting precisely because associated news reports foreground in a particularly forceful way the fantasmatic dimension of its narratives. One key advantage of deploying a logics approach is that, by emphasizing the interrelation between social, political, and fantasmatic logics, it can help elucidate the political and ideological significance of those fantasmatic aspects.


Applying the Logics Framework to Illuminate `Aspects of Adaptation to Failure’​[5]​

In deploying the logics framework, we make use of the basic elements of Goffman’s ‘Cooling the Mark Out’ to structure our argument: the venture (section 3), the accident and blowout (section 4), the squawk (section 5), and cooling out the mark (section 6). The crucial parts of our argument concern squawking and cooling, because it is during these phases that political logics are mobilized to pre-empt public contestation of key norms that structure the financial system, as well as to restore and reaffirm those norms. We suggest that these (pre-emptive and restorative) political logics are underpinned by a set of fantasies whose power and drive can best be understood against the background of the original venture – a venture that was suddenly and rudely interrupted by an unfortunate ‘accident’, not to mention a breathtakingly arrogant ‘blowoff’. (See Table 1)

PLACE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE


We can briefly say something about each of these phases. The venture corresponds to the 20 years or so preceding the ‘accident’. It describes a period of steady growth in the financial sector, and an increasing influence of its social logics of financialization​[6]​ upon the mass of producers and consumers as well as to the rise of an (increasingly global) elite of bankers and corporate executives. During this phase, political logics functioned primarily in an instituting mode: they served to establish and facilitate the operation of innovative social logics. The neoliberal finance regime was underpinned by, and in turn fed into, potent fantasies of unlimited growth and prosperity, expressed succinctly in the slogan ‘no more boom and bust’, though the fantasmatic dimension of the regime is perhaps more grippingly conveyed in the expression ‘no bust, only boom’. The fantasy was fuelled by rapidly growing and extravagantly-leveraged consumption practices. Over this long period of boom, the beatific dimension of these fantasies seeped deep into the psyche of the citizen-consumer, making it difficult to acknowledge, let alone dislodge.

Immediately following the ‘accident’ and ‘blowoff’ (spectacularly embodied in the bailouts) there were expressions of disbelief shock, fear, and horror, quickly followed by loud and angry calls to identify and punish those responsible for the Big Crunch. In response to this loud and inchoate ‘squawk’, political logics were mobilized that gave it a more concrete shape and sense. New elements were woven into the fantasmatic logic so as to keep alive its beatific dimension. The figure of the ‘greedy banker’ emerged as the paradigmatic embodiment of the ‘spoiler of the party’ whose continuing tenure was diagnosed as the chief obstacle to ‘a return to the good old times’. Other bogey figures who appeared in the media at this juncture - the incompetent regulator, the irresponsible consumer, the morally corrupt MP, the overpaid public sector professional - served to reinforce the sense of an obstacle to a perfectly attainable fantasmatic ideal (see also Chang & Glynos 2011). Political logics in this phase assumed a primarily pre-emptive character, for example, in dividing bankers into a vast majority of ‘good’ ones and a few ‘bad’ ones, or in separating out the ‘responsible’ homeowners from the ‘irresponsible’ ones. Together the combined effect of pre-emptive political logics and fantasmatic logics during this phase was, whether intended or not, to deflect attention away from potentially more problematic structural issues.

In our account of the cooling phase, we focus upon the example of the United Kingdom Financial Investements Ltd (UKFI) – a key institutional vehicle set up by the UK government charged with the task of maximizing the return to the taxpayer qua shareholder of the (nationalized) banks. Remarkably, UKFI is a company populated largely by private sector finance ‘operators’, although it is entirely owned by the Treasury (a public sector ‘operator’). Far from questioning the apparently discredited principles underpinning market finance practices, part of the solution to the crisis and the public deficit is to ‘win back’ a good portion of what was lost by encouraging shrewd investment practices, overseen by UKFI. Although political logics have also had a pre-emptive character, the predominant mode of operation in this phase has been restorative in nature – notably, by requiring the nationalized banks to maximize their appeal to prospective investors and by anticipating how the public would soon be handsomely rewarded for their bargain basement investment in failed banks. In the main, we argue, politics logics have consolidated and reaffirmed the social logics of the neoliberal finance regime by tapping into fantasies that resonate with those from the venture period. While fantasmatic logics have served primarily as glue for the social logics of financialization during the venture phase, fantasmatic logics during the squawk and cooling phases have provided a way of facilitating and energizing the operation of political logics that marginalized attempts to contest the neoliberal finance regime. In doing so, they narrowed the field of public debate to a remarkable degree, excluding from public awareness alternative accounts of the crisis, as well as alternative visions of the future.

Before turning to a more detailed analysis of these phases, however, it is worth clarifying here how we see the relationship between our logics approach and Goffman’s analysis. While the logics approach functions as our primary explanatory driver, Goffman’s phases function for us as a key framing device that gives our explanation a clear narrative structure. In doing so we do not wish in any way to deny that his essay is incredibly rich and insightful in intuition, illustration, as well as inspiration, nor that its substantive detail is not irrelevant to our project. In addition to our earlier qualifications regarding the parallels with Goffman’s essay, there is another important difference in emphasis that we wish to underline here. While Goffman’s central motivation is animated by a social-psychological question (how do we cope with, or avoid, humiliating injuries to the self), we are motivated by a politico-ideological question (how do we account for the way the contestation of suspect finance norms is minimized or marginalized). No doubt there are interesting and productive connections to be made on a substantive-explanatory plane too, but to do so would have been to introduce a degree of complexity, not to mention the need for further detailed exegetical development, that we considered too unwieldy to handle in the context of this paper.​[7]​


3. The ‘Venture’: No More Bust, only Boom

Once ‘[t]he confidence of the mark has been won’, he is invited ‘to invest his money in a gambling venture’. He is ‘permitted to win some money’, and then he is ‘persuaded to invest more.’ (Goffman 1952: 451) In our analysis the ‘venture’, or rather the ‘ventures’ (in the plural), correspond to a range of activities situated within a regime of neoliberal finance (see exhibit 1). 

PLACE EXHIBIT 1 ABOUT HERE

Over a period of 20 years from the 1980s to 2007, the neo-liberal regime underwent steady expansion greatly facilitated by new financial instruments (Willmott, 2011) that produced an assemblage of social logics of financialization, for example: logics of deregulation, logics of risk dispersal, leveraging logics, and logics of speculation. Consider the social logic of risk dispersal, often associated with processes of securitization. Housing, usually the single largest asset in a household portfolio is the clearest example of how assets became subject to this social logic. An established lending practice based upon the retention of risk by lenders (e.g. building societies and banks) was progressively displaced by another practice in which claims to  mortgage repayments are pooled, bundled, packaged and sold to financial market investors (e.g. banks, pension funds and hedge funds according to their ‘risk appetite’) as investment bonds.In this way, capital and risk became increasingly transferred, through securitization, from the housing circuit to the financial circuit (see Aalbers, 2008). The market for the trading of these securities was effectively shut from late 2007 until mid- 2009 but has, since then, been re-opened to some extent.  

As a consequence of this risk dispersal, home ownership, and by extension an ever-increasing part of the ‘lifeworld’,​[8]​ became more directly connected to the operation of capital markets (Langley, 2008). This dispersal facilitated and resonated with social logics of leverage not only in investment banks (Sorkin, 2010), in management buyouts and in private equity ventures, but also amongst the mass of property owners and consumers who ratcheted up their debt. Facilitated by easy access to cheap credit, Anglo-American lifestyles became increasingly financed by borrowing against (home) equity (Mian and Sufi, 2008). As owners of domestic (and commercial) property bought into this logic of financialization, they increasingly came to view ‘their’ assets, notably housing, as something that could be leveraged speculatively – to turn a quick buck, to finance ballooning personal debt, to cover emergency outlays, or simply to make ends meet. Property ownership, previously regarded and desired primarily as a means of setting up a home or gaining greater security, became reframed as an asset against which to increase borrowing – for consumption or as part of a growing asset portfolio (e.g. through buy-to-let mortgages). Social logics of financialization were thus by no means confined to elite practices. They informed, and were also buttressed by, mass participation in the everyday financing of activities.


Since our aim here is not to describe in systematic detail the social logics comprising the regime of neoliberal finance, we now address the relationship between these social logics and the operation of political and fantasmatic logics. Insofar as political logics were operative during the ‘venture’ phase, they tended symbiotically to entrench, rather than question, the dominant social and fantasmatic logics of the neoliberal finance regime. In effect, they shuffled the political dimension to the margins of public discourse. (As noted above, we link the political dimension of social relations to the idea of public contestation.) Consider, for example, what we could call political ‘techno-logics’. As the name suggests, such political logics were associated with concerted efforts to distance various technologies, especially financial technologies, from public scrutiny (see Froud et al., 2010). These political logics were also embedded in, and legitimized by, an increasing reliance on actual computer technologies. Advanced computerized stochastic modelling (seemingly) ensured an authoritative transfer of credit risk and hedging. It effectively depoliticized financial risk and naturalized its contingent cultural and political origins (see Colander et al, 2008; Lawson, 2009; DeGoede, 2004). In the design and operation of these techno-logics, an elite of `quant-jocks’, traders, regulators and politicians established a situation in which financial markets were effectively insulated from public intelligibility and scrutiny, let alone democratic politics. Techno-logics are thus understood to be a form of political logic because they serve as rallying points around which key elite groups mobilise themselves in a way that keeps at bay the contestability of the norms governing the (neoliberal finance) regime that secures and expands their privileges.

Consider now the fantasmatic dimension of the neoliberal finance regime. This can be illustrated by turning to UK Chancellor Gordon Brown’s confident assertion that

‘for 40 years our economy has an unenviable history, under governments of both parties, of boom and bust. So, against a background of mounting uncertainty and instability in the global economy, we set about establishing a new economic framework to secure long-term economic stability and put an end to the damaging cycle of boom and bust’. In his last budget report the Chancellor confirmed that: ‘we will never return to the old boom and bust’ (Channel 4 News, 2008)​[9]​.

Embracing such a fantasy was made easier – some might say possible – because it was underpinned by faith in a constellation of guarantors, including economic, financial, and scientific experts and institutions. Confidence in securitization practices, for example, presupposed a cast of clever bankers, astute regulators, smart builders of financial instruments, and savvy traders who, collectively, were believed to have finally perfected a means of identifying, hedging, and managing risk so that boom would no longer be followed by bust.​[10]​ Following a prolonged and seemingly endless boom, the idea that extensive securitization distributed risk benignly and productively was endorsed by key actors, most notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve. In common with a range of high profile academics (see Krugmann, 2009), these actors subscribed to one or another version of the ‘only boom’ headline. And of course widespread endorsement of this fantasmatic narrative extended to finance journalism, as well as popular news print and media broadcasts, represented most shamelessly in prime-time TV property investment shows. In this sort of context, it would have been remarkable if the ‘mark’ had seriously doubted the idea that the ‘venture’ was ‘fixed in his favor’ (Goffman, 1952: 451). ‘Go forth and enjoy!’ was the unequivocal proclamation to citizens who were the unresisting recipients of this winning message.

Of course the enjoyment linked to the ‘only boom’ fantasy was not restricted to the investment practices themselves, whether by elites or the general public. The notion of getting ‘something for nothing’, or the anticipated or actual thrill of repeated, risk-free ‘wins’ is clearly palpable.  But the ‘no bust, only boom’ headline fantasy made possible, and was endorsed and supported by, a wide-ranging array of related fantasmatic enjoyments. A cascade of consumer and investment fantasies was unleashed. Availing themselves of the opportunity to grow their assets at zero or minimum risk, or to increase their consumption by borrowing against their existing assets, the ‘marks’ (borrowers, investors, buyers) were certain ‘winners’. How foolish not to seize the opportunity to maximize leverage?​[11]​


4. The Accident and Blowoff





5. Squawking: Lambasting Greedy Bankers

As Goffman’s analysis contemplates: ‘Sometimes… a mark is not quite prepared to accept his loss as a gain in experience and to say and do nothing about his venture. He may feel moved to complain to the police or to chase after the operators. In the terminology of the trade, the mark may squawk…’ (Goffman 1952: 451-2; emphasis added). We will suggest that this ‘chase-and-squawk’ was dramatized most spectacularly and insistently in the media with reference to one particular figure: the greedy banker.

PLACE EXHIBIT 2 ABOUT HERE

The greedy banker became a paradigmatic target around which to focus public expressions of outrage, as well as calls for punishment. Think of Fred Goodwin, Bernie Madoff, or even the institutional figure of Lehmann Brothers or its hapless CEO, Dick Fuld. Yet the attribution of greed does not just convey the idea of moral corruption in a banker’s single-minded pursuit of ‘loadsamoney’. More troubling (and fascinating) is the idea that bankers enjoy themselves. Newspapers loudly and repeatedly emphasized this trait, clearly indexing an arresting fascination with reports of such ‘enjoyed’ greed. Does the prevalence of such reports not suggest that we, as their readers,  procure a modicum of enjoyment by exposing and targeting the enjoyment of the greedy banker? As late as April 2010, The Sun (23 April) piqued its readers interest with the headline: ‘Business as Usual for Greedy Bankers’ followed by a story that again repeated a narrative of greed and ‘up yours’, with graphic accounts of how ‘the scumbags’ are ‘partying like the recession never happened’. The notion that bankers are enjoying themselves is clearly reinforced by an implicit contrast with the ordinary reader who struggling to make ends meet as s/he battles with the effects of the recession.

However, what fans the flames of rage more than anything else is the idea that ‘their’ enjoyment has been ‘stolen’ from us, that ‘their’ enjoyment comes at ‘our’ expense. This should be understood as a reference not just to the much commented-on bailouts, but also to our having to suffer higher taxes, public service cuts, unemployment, and so on as the bankers continue to enjoy extravagant life-styles funded by huge bonuses. The Scottish Sun (2008, 18 October) notes, for example, how the government ‘signed off a whopping £1.3 billion bonus pot for investment bankers at RBS, which is 84 per cent state owned [and that] equate(s) to around £75,000 for each member of staff – more than triple the average British worker’s salary of £24,200 per year.’ Readers were also treated to detailed reports of the partying of Lloyds TBS staff shortly after the government acquired 41 per cent of the merged HBOS-Lloyds TSB bank by injecting £17bn of taxpayer’s money into it:

FATCAT Lloyds TSB bankers gorged themselves on a sumptuous five-course feast at Scotland’s most exclusive hotel – just days after getting a share of a £17billion bailout paid for by YOU. As Scots families struggled to beat the credit crunch, the money men scoffed salmon terrine and beef fillet while quaffing expensive fine wines at Gleneagles in Perthshire. Afterwards they retired to the swanky hotel bar and roared with laughter while ordering whiskies costing up to £1,000 A NIP (emphasis added). 

Apart from the ‘theft of enjoyment’ theme present in numerous news reports, another telltale sign indicating the presence of enjoyment is the often extreme oscillation between incompatible positions or judgements regarding the particular figure of fascination (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p. 148), a typical pattern linked to other common scapegoats, such as the ‘welfare scrounger’. So, for example, bankers are often depicted as incompetent wreckers of the entire economy. On the other hand, they are also frequently portrayed as super-clever masterminds who undertake unimaginably large and complex financial transactions and know how to fix and play the system to their benefit, by `shorting’ weak stocks, bonds and currencies, thereby making them weaker, and by relying, for example, on the banks being too big to be allowed to fail.

What is the significance of this monotonous and repetitive, yet oddly compelling, focus on banker’s enjoyment: their bonuses, their parties, their arrogant disregard for the plight of others, including the most vulnerable in society? Of course, we could say that squawking has the effect of assuaging, at least in part, the raw anger felt by the marks, with the pillorying of the greedy bankers offering ‘the red top version of catharsis’ (CRESC, 2009: 19). Scapegoating the bankers and, to a lesser extent, the politicians, regulators, and even irresponsible borrowers and consumers, is difficult to resist because it provides a certain enjoyment, or jouissance – as when, for example the ‘scumbag millionaires’ (The Sun, 2009, 11 February) are reported to have received a dressing down at the hands of a parliamentary committee. They, after all, are the ‘rotters’, incarnating the ‘Other who has stolen our enjoyment’. As one commentator put it when responding to an article in The Daily Mail tellingly titled “MPs grill Barclays boss: It's time to stop saying sorry for bonuses says fattest cat” that appeared the day after Barclays CEO, Bob Diamond had been called before the Parliamentary Treasury Select Committee on 11th January 2001: 

`Parasites, and all of you will have to go through very hard times now to pay for it. It’s not the unions, it’s not students, or disabled people on benefits who have caused this, it’s your leaders in partnership with the city. In other words the bankers who say they have to pay large bonus to keep the top people. Well if passing down a £10,000 debit to every man, woman and child is top people they can bog off now. Watching TV just after the start of this mess one top money expert was asked "How do we stop it happening again" his answer "take the top bankers out and hang them". From the arrogance shown by Diamond I think I now agree with hanging them(The Daily Mail, 12 January, 2011).


The most obvious political consequence of this sort of squawking, however, relates to the extreme narrowing of public debate and the marginalization of the political dimension of the neoliberal finance regime. A focus on a small number of high profile ‘bastards’ has diverted attention from the system over which ostensibly more legitimate banking progeny continue to preside. As DeGoede (2009: 306) has commented:

‘[T]he present focus on the bonus culture, entails a very problematic and populist narrowing of the debate. It allows ordinary citizens an easy target to voice their critiques of the financial sector and it allows…[ministers] to make a seemingly firm stand against the financial industries. In the meantime, the complex product innovations and more fundamental risk cultures of the markets are in the process of being placed beyond public debate.’

Regarding the nationalized banks, for example, there has been very little discussion and debate about how the current financial regime should be reformed and what role the public, as the majority shareholder, can and should play in exercising control over key banking decisions.  By fixing our gaze upon the moral failures of personalities or upon the narrow confines of the bonus culture, wider structural features of the finance regime are shuffled out of public sight. Žižek  (2009:  37)  expresses it this way: 

‘Over the last several months, public figures from the Pope downwards have bombarded us with injunctions to fight against the culture of excessive greed and consumption. This disgusting spectacle of cheap moralization is an ideological operation if there ever was one. The compulsion (to expand) inscribed into the system itself is translated into a matter of personal sin, a private psychological propensity.’ 

There is a palpable enjoyment associated with the act of scapegoating the ‘greedy banker’. But as we saw earlier, enjoyment is structured in fantasy, and so the wider political and ideological implications become clearer when the fantasmatic logics are brought more fully into view. At this point, however, it is possible to show how a fixation of the newsprint media on the greedy banker, who is held responsible for the financial meltdown, and is now being awarded huge bonuses payable only because public funding rescued the financial system, can feed into a set of pre-emptive political logics – logics that actively background the political dimensions and moments of the neoliberal finance regime.

Consider various logics of difference that reinforce the personal morality theme by drawing a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ bankers, thereby weakening the antagonistic frontier separating the bankers from the people whose active challenge to the social logics of finance could potentially secure more ambitious reforms of the banking sector. A separation of ‘good’ from ‘bad’ bankers, and ‘more’ or ‘less’ insolvent banks, conveniently discourages and perhaps excludes close and sustained scrutiny of the casino-like characteristics of finance capitalism (e.g. speculation, excessive leverage, predatory lending etc) that have continued, and indeed have been tacitly encouraged, as a means of restoring the balance sheet of UK plc. But the antagonistic frontier separating bankers from the people can also be weakened from the ‘other side’ when a distinction is drawn between ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’ borrowers and consumers, not just lenders (Watson 2009). Together these logics of signification, which sometimes mutate in status into political logics, function in a pre-emptive mode, keeping the political moment at bay. They have served to bolster the scapegoating narrative, but also to refine it in a way that makes more acceptable the idea that banks and bankers had to be ‘bailed out’, and that it is now necessary to disregard the public’s ownership and potential control over the banks in order to restore their profitability as a basis for returning them to private ownership at the earliest opportunity, thereby leaving intact the basic social logics of the neoliberal finance regime.

A  political logic of recuperation has thereby emerged, rather than a transformative political logic. Such restoration has been made possible by a period of ‘cooling’, wherein the basic norms of neoliberal finance have been reasserted with force and confidence. In the following section we examine several key cooling devices.


6. Cooling: Soothing Reports and United Kingdom Financial Investements Ltd (UKFI)

`Squawking’, from the point of view of the banking and finance industries can be ‘bad for business’. ‘It gives [them]… a bad reputation… In order to avoid this adverse publicity, an additional phase is sometimes added at the end of play. It is called cooling the mark out’ (Goffman, 1952: 451). We argue that key reports, such as the Wigley and Bischoff reports, as well as UK Financial Investments Limited (UKFI)​[13]​, can be viewed as important (restorative) cooling devices designed to reaffirm the value of neoliberal finance capital. Such devices are developed following the blowoff in an effort `to keep the anger of the mark within manageable and sensible proportions’ (ibid). They serve as fora within which a set of restorative political logics can be performed. 

Consider the Wigley Report (2008), portions of which found their way into the White Paper Reforming Financial Markets (Treasury HM, 2009). This report, commissioned by the Lord Mayor of London, called inter alia for an independent study to examine whether the UK’s tax regime is sufficiently competitive by international standards (Wigley, 2008: 32). For its part, the Bischoff Report (2009), jointly chaired by the Chancellor, was clear in its rejection of the idea of separating retail and investment banking and also heavily criticised the earlier Turner review (Turner, 2009) in which the social value of much innovation in financial services was at least doubted. These reports elaborate a narrative that is replete with restorative logics that affirm the social value of finance and that seek to preserve London as the global capital of finance. No consideration is given to alternative interpretations of the nature of the crisis or of the financial system. In effect, alternative strategies are framed as remote and self-evidently unfeasible if not completely unthinkable. Given that the membership of these committees was drawn almost exclusively from an elite of finance-related experts led by, respectively, the former chairman of Citigroup and the European chairman of Merrill Lynch, their diagnosis and prescriptions are hardly unexpected (CRESC, 2009). The government relied upon a narrative generated by finance insiders to frame relevant policy choices.​[14]​ In the UK, this framing has taken the form of emphasizing the importance of financial pay-back, and not on present or future political control of the purpose, responsiveness or accountability of financial activity. The operation of UKFI serves as a paradigmatic illustration of this restorative effort.

Established on 3 November 2008, UKFI was constructed in haste in the wake of the financial crisis to address the issue of how to organize and manage the UK’s government’s stake in the failed banks. UKFI is an obscure organization with virtually no public visibility. It is a Company wholly owned by HM Treasury and operates from a small suite of offices on Treasury premises. In May 2010, the UKFI Board comprised 7 people, 5 of them having a background in private sector financial services, one in public sector finance, and one predominantly in the industrial sector. The three most senior members of the ‘UKFI Team’ all have a background in private financial services (UKFI website, 17 May, 2010). There is no evidence of a wider constituency – of trade unionists, academics, NGOs, etc. - on its staff or as members of its committees. Indeed, in a letter to the Financial Times), an unsuccessful applicant to one of the posts of non-executive director of UKFI noted how the `brisk rejection of [his] application by the recruitment agency indicated that they required candidates “with fund management experience”’ (Perman, 2009, 18 February). 

Even allowing for some hyperbole, the BBC’s Robert Peston has observed of UKFI that ‘[i]t's probably no exaggeration to say that - for the coming year or two at least - UKFI will be as important to all of us as the Treasury, or the Bank of England or the City watchdog, the Financial Services Authority’ (Peston, 2008, 24 December). For an institution of such importance, it is remarkable how little attention it has received from the media and other commentators, including academics. When mention of UKFI is made, the focus is invariably upon changes in its personnel or news of the appointment of advisors, or at best whether the cash bonuses of nationalized bank employees should be capped at a particular figure (e.g. Kleinmann, 2010, 19 December), rather than scrutiny of its mission​[15]​. Illustrative is the reporting by the Guardian, a left-leaning quality UK newspaper, in which UKFI’s appointment of banker Jim O’Neill to advise on the sale of the stake in the nationalized banks is couched in a narrative of greediness rather than any questioning of the loss of public control following from their sale: 
Jim O'Neil, the latest Merrill Lynch banker to be recruited by UKFI (UK Financial Investments) (​http:​/​​/​www.guardian.co.uk​/​business​/​ukfi-uk-financial-investments" \o "More from guardian.co.uk on UKFI (UK Financial Investments)​), will be paid £180,000-a-year to advise the government on the best moment to offload the state's stakes in Royal Bank of Scotland (​http:​/​​/​www.guardian.co.uk​/​business​/​royalbankofscotlandgroup" \o "More from guardian.co.uk on Royal Bank of Scotland​) and Lloyds Banking Group (​http:​/​​/​www.guardian.co.uk​/​business​/​lloyds-banking-group" \o "More from guardian.co.uk on Lloyds Banking Group​). Okay, the salary might not secure bragging rights in the investment banking world. But didn't Mark Hoban, the City minister, tell this paper the other day that "I don't think anyone really expected there'd be a sale in the shares of RBS or Lloyds over the course of the next 12 or 18 months"?  So, that's £180k-a-year for saying "hold". Nice (The Guardian, 2010, 19 July).
The activities of UKFI, we will suggest, are structured by a restorative fantasmatic logic in which a neo-liberal discourse of shareholder value and light touch regulation has been uncritically reflected in the rare media reports of UKFI thereby helping to insulate markets from democratic scrutiny and control (Froud et al. , 2010). 

A key feature in the establishment and activity of UKFI has been its positioning within a narrative that defines it as a private market player rather than a state-owned organisation. In effect, UKFI operates like a private institutional investor with a very narrow portfolio comprising a few large distressed assets. Reflecting this priority, the 2009 Annual Report of UKFI highlights its role as an institutional investor and its active participation in many investor meetings. There is no reference to consultation with its citizen-shareholders through regional or local meetings with those in whose interests UKFI claims to act. In constituting the identity and role of UKFI, the generation of ‘shareholder value’ and its formal remoteness from government are the recurrent watchwords that ensure a separation of markets from public scrutiny: 

The Principal activity of the Company is managing the Government’s investments in financial institutions to protect and create value for the taxpayer as shareholders through active engagement with the investee companies. The Company has a Framework Document with HM Treasury which sets out the key parameters or how we will conduct our business, including a clear mandate to manage the investments commercially, and robust institutional arrangements for keeping UKFI at arm’s length’s from Government (UKFI, 2009, p.49, emphases added).

Such statements echo the ‘social value of finance’ narrative developed in the Wigley and Bishoff Reports and an associated emphasis upon distancing financial markets from media enquiry and political scrutiny. Focusing upon pay-back ensures that the political formation and aims of UKFI - and more specifically the possibility that it could be advancing a very different agenda – is backgrounded. To illustrate the point, its preferred strategy for launching the sale of the banks (placed on indefinite `hold’ at the time of writing) is to headhunt high ranking City players (see Guardian, 2010, 8March). In Goffman’s framework, these are the ‘operators’ left behind to ‘define the situation’ for the ‘marks’, now defined as investors who are encouraged to fantasise about future returns resulting from the profitable sale of previously distressed assets, in a way that will allow them `to accept the inevitable and quietly go home.’ (Goffman, 1952: 451).

By setting itself the aim of securing a return on the public stake in the nationalized banks, the marks are cooled out by the prospect that they will get their money back as the banks are returned to private ownership. The taxpayer has thereby been rhetorically redescribed (or ‘defined’) as a shareholder, and the much more substantial losses occasioned by the recession and measures taken to cushion its impacts (e.g. through quantitative easing) are displaced. How can one oppose maximizing one’s shareholder value? On the contrary, we should positively encourage such maximization and the (neoliberal) conditions which could enhance this prospect. The taxpayer is, after all, on the same side as the savvy financial operator. With the establishment of UKFI, the ‘marks’ – that is, UK citizens who as deposit-holders in UK plc are shareholders in the part-nationalized banks – have been ‘cooled out’ with the promise that this shadowy organization will safeguard their interests – interests that have been defined in very narrow terms that disregard the bigger `hit’ taken by the marks while simultaneously reinforcing the value of finance. In short, the appeal of UKFI resides in the promise it embodies to return to ‘business as usual’, in effect bypassing any engagement in public debated about possible transformative options. 

The bailed out banks have not entirely escaped criticism and protest: they have been challenged not only by small and medium sized business owners and other prospective borrowers (e.g. mortgages seekers who lack a very substantial deposit) but also by the Governor of the Bank of England who has also lamented politicians’ disinclination to apply firm pressure upon the failed banks to make loans available to companies and individuals. The banking sector could have been charged – by UKFI or an equivalent body – with funding forms of economic activity that foster long-term employment and/or prioritize the development of ecologically less damaging manufacturing processes, products and services (see, for example, NEF 2010a, 2010b). The state could have incentivized the development of credit unions, mutual organizations and not-for-profit companies in which social, rather than financial, objectives are prioritized. In particular, UKFI could have used its shareholding powers to influence or change the banks’ core business models, such as the way in which mortgages are priced through market mechanisms (see Watson, 2009). In the event, however, such demands and associated agendas were not widely articulated or effectively pressed. Notably, UKFI declined to exercise its veto on the size of bonuses negotiated by the Chancellor in return for providing £282bn of insurance for the most toxic of loans (​http:​/​​/​www.guardian.co.uk​/​business​/​2009​/​dec​/​02​/​rbs-warns-over-bonus-cap" \o "​) (The Guardian, 2010, 24 February). In general, the narrow mission of UKFI has gone largely unexamined by politicians and unchallenged by the media. 




We have suggested that the cooling operation following the financial crisis of 2007- has been largely about restoring the status quo of a neoliberal finance regime and the fantasy that underpins it. So how have we accounted for the willingness of the ‘marks’ of the financial crisis to be ‘cooled out’? The absence of mass popular protest and calls for radical change suggests that it has been possible to define the situation for the `marks’ in a way that makes it easy for them (us) to accept the inevitable and quietly go home. We have linked the muted (dumbfounded?) reaction to the financial crisis with an acute, yet dimly appreciated, dependence on financial markets that was aided and abetted by the rapid spread of securitization practices that fed, and was fed by, a ‘no bust, only boom’ fantasy. 

When the financial markets ‘locked up’ in 2008, and only state intervention could re-liquidate them, the credibility of the central tenet of neo-liberalism appeared to be in tatters. But anger at the collapse of the financial system did not translate into demands or policies that depart substantially from neo-liberalism. Why not? The absence of contestation, in the form or resistance or even significant debate (during the UK general election of 2010, for example), is in part attributable to how the immediate pain of recession has been mitigated by increasing our public indebtedness through a temporary reduction in taxation and postponing cuts in pubic spending. In the period following the crisis, and despite the traumatic collapse of the financial system, life for most people continued more or less as normal; and for those with the greatest mortgage debts who remained employed, the cut in interest rates helped maintain their disposable income at tolerable, even comfortable, levels. 

Such measures (e.g. lowering of interest rates, quantitative easing, temporary cuts in consumption taxes) have cushioned the recessionary effects of the meltdown. But we have pointed to the role of fantasmatic and political logics that, in emphasising the greed of bankers, and the social value of the financial system, have recuperated the social logics of financialization in conditions that have invited their demise. To account for the willingness of the marks to be cooled out, we have pointed to the depth of material investment in, and affective attachment to, the dominant financialization discourse that, in the past 25 years, has come to penetrate and pervade everyday life. 

We have stressed how a fantasmatic frame structures the enjoyment embedded in scapegoating stories, an enjoyment that also energizes a range of pre-emptive logics. What gives libidinal value to, and renders equivalent, a whole series of scapegoats (whether the greedy banker, the irresponsible borrower or consumer, the incompetent regulator or politician, and so on) is the idea that they embody an obstacle to an ideal which is preserved by the scapegoating process. 

The character of the relation between obstacle and ideal tends to give the fantasmatic narrative a beatific or horrific hue (see Glynos 2001:93-6; Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 14; Stavrakakis, 1999:pp 108-9). When, for example, the obstacle threatens to overwhelm the ideal, the horrific dimension of the fantasy comes to the fore. The horrific dimension of the fantasmatic scenario is manifest in the widespread use of epidemiological metaphors. Seemingly pure, ‘AAA assets’ are suddenly transformed into ‘toxic assets’; and their ‘toxicity’ is understood to ‘contaminate’ the entire financial system. Thus, at the height of the crisis, the Daily Star screamed that ‘one [unidentified] expert described it as “a financial Armageddon, doomsday and nuclear war rolled into one”.’ (The Daily Star, 2008, 16 September). In this ‘horrific’ version of the fantasmatic narrative the financial regime has become ‘contaminated’ by ‘greedy bankers’ and ‘irresponsible borrowers’ who were prepared to take excessive and ‘reckless risks’.

When, on the other hand, the obstacle recedes from view, the beatific dimension of the fantasy comes to the fore. And here the shift in the headline content of the operant fantasy is clear. ‘No more bust, only boom’ has been irretrievably tarnished on account of its association with the arrogant hubris of the ‘masters of the universe’. And so in the early stages of the crisis, there appeared clear expressions of a nostalgic fantasy of the ‘good old days of capitalism’. Libidinal flows were redirected from the turbo-capitalism of ‘no more bust, only boom’ to a more traditional prudent capitalism in which the values of ‘safety’ and ‘stability’ rose in prominence.

There is an interplay of the beatific and horrific dimensions of the fantasmatic logic, as the distance between obstacle and ideal gets negotiated in the various newsprint narratives. Consider, for example, the construction of the ‘inevitability’ of the bail-out for virtually all banks at the height of the crisis in September and October 2008. The ‘inevitability thesis’ was sustained libidinally by means of the much disseminated Armageddon scenario which would follow in its absence. Again, this was an ideological move in the sense that the spectre of horror it elicited implied a fantasmatic ideal that reproduced an already accepted way of life upon which we have become dependent. It thereby helped actively to deny the radical contingency of an existing and hegemonic neoliberal regime of finance.​[16]​ 

When commending restoration rather than transformation, ‘prudence’ became the watchword most favoured by government officials and policy makers. The ideological significance of this rhetoric was that it allowed  key figures to be critical of a reckless era whilst at the same time reaffirming the basic principles of the existing structure of the finance regime. Such manoeuvering is ideological in the precise sense that the contingency of a neoliberal financial order is never seriously put into question. Appeals to ‘prudent banking’, ‘prudent lending’, ‘prudent borrowing’, were messages which reinforced – in inverse form – the way the crisis had been constructed as a problem of personal, moral culpability. The political logic of ‘prudent banking’ received its energy and persuasive power from the nostalgic fantasy of the decent and measured capitalism of the past. ’Prudent banking’ thus has not only an ideological role to play, but also a restorative impact.

The central, seductive message conveyed in a restorative political logic of prudent banking is that the future attainment of stability demands only minimal reform or sacrifice. It was a key message of the UK Wigley and Bischoff Reports in which the ‘social value of finance’ is repeatedly intoned and where the importance, if not indispensability, of a stable banking system for our ‘way of life’ is insistently underscored. Even at the time of the ‘credit crunch’, when wholesale markets were beginning to seize up, Alistair Darling, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, called for a return to ‘good old fashioned banking’ cleansed of greed and reckless risk-taking (The Telegraph, 2007, 13 September). We interpret this as a nostalgic entreaty intended  to calm anxious ‘marks’ by restoring ‘prudent borrowing and lending’. The marks, seeing their (our!) hard-earned savings, pensions and jobs being put at risk, have been eager to have these assets better protected, and have been also been encouraged to expect the loans for bailing out of the banks to be repaid with interest. 


With this background, it should not be so surprising that the most voluble, widely reported, calls for reform have demanded the rebuilding and strengthening of the existing system through ‘improved market discipline’ (Treasury HM, 2009). We have noted how the establishment and objectives of UKFI have affirmed and institutionalized this ‘only boom’ fantasy by assuming that the financial crisis prompts no radical questioning of financial institutions and that restoration of the established social logics of neoliberal financialization is the self-evident response to its effects. As Gordon Brown put it, ‘[i]f you're a saver, a homeowner, an entrepreneur, a family struggling to get by – I want you to know that we are doing this for you’ (The Guardian, 2008, 9 October). What `this’ turned out to be was the creation of UKFI, an institution operated by members of a discredited financial elite who run UKFI like a private equity fund that has a narrow portfolio and the sole objective of re-privatizing its assets. 

For their part, the media has reproduced analyses and prescriptions that remain in thrall to such everyday material investments. The key recommendations of official reports (e.g. the Bischoff and Wigley reports) are communicated, but they are rarely subjected to systematic critical scrutiny or expose their exclusion of radical options. Alternative explanations and understandings of the crisis and ways forward have been marginalized​[17]​. This moment of exclusion is not so much part of the cooling process as it is a condition of this particular (neoliberal) cooling operation. The part-nationalization of RBS and LloydsTSB did momentarily raise the prospect of greater public control and direction over these banks and the banking system more generally. Proposals were floated, and discussed in parliament, that recommended the re-mutualization of Northern Rockwhich accounts for the the most striking example of the failure of the demutualization frenzy of the 1990s (Klimecki and Willmott, 2009), and/or the transformation of failed banks into a ‘People’s Bank’ operating through the Post Office network. But interest in such possibilities, including credit unions and the expansion of mutual organizations, has turned out to be fleeting in the absence of sustained media attention upon, and political support for, such proposals. Instead, the media focus has been upon `greedy bankers’ and `outrageous bonuses’. The moment for radical institutional change was in the end displaced by a more personalized, visceral attack on particular individuals, as Froud et al (2010: 30) have also noted:  

‘What had seemed like the very peak of a democratic assault- the ferocious criticism of Goodwin-also turned out to provide a key form of defence against radical reform: in scapegoating Goodwin it allowed the development of a narrative separating “bad” and ”good” bankers. It opened the very highest reaches of the core executive to members of the financial elite, in the form both of ministerial appointments and in the shaping of institutions like UKFI in the image of a part of the City elite.’ 





We have deployed the logics framework to argue that two key elements of the dominant narrative in the public realm – (i) the exemplary pillorying of a few reckless, `bad apple’ bankers and (ii) return to business as usual – have, so far, served to sooth and cool the ‘marks’. The discursive articulation of the 2007-8 crisis has in this sense successfully established a dominant understanding of ‘bust’ as an ‘excess’ – an irrationally abnormal deviation from the normal smooth running of markets (DeGoede, 2009) – which is to be enjoyed as a spectacle, rather than a near catastrophe that merits greater public scrutiny and possible intervention. 

Fantasmatic logics, scapegoating enjoyment, and a whole array of pre-emptive and restorative political logics, we have argued, have helped promote ideological closure and thereby kept the political dimension of a neoliberal finance regime at bay. Media interpretations of the crisis have been dominated by a dual-pronged narrative in which the policy priority of securing restorative closure has been accompanied by a populist pillorying of scapegoats, typically in the form of greedy bankers. In the absence of sustained, public debate about the pervasiveness and constituent elements of neoliberal finance practices (e.g. in the form of securitization), it is difficult to get beyond feelings of resentment towards bankers whose greed is the commonsensical explanation of the crisis, and an associated belief that some more effective way must be found for regulating their activities so as to restore the ‘good times’.

In stressing the categories of subjectivity, desire and enjoyment, we have illuminated aspects of the narrowing-to-the-point-of-closure of public debate. Our analysis suggests that financialization is not only embraced at the level of conscious consent but is also sustained and reproduced by the libidinal, affective investment of ‘subjects’ – the marks (see also: Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008). We have noted how the logics of financialization remain in the ascendant despite their apparent discrediting by the financial meltdown. The recuperation, we have suggested, is facilitated by a fantasmatic logic comprising beatific and horrific elements. 

In response to the dislocations of the financial crisis, a restorative political logic, energized by a nostaligic fantasy of a ‘golden era of capitalism’, has emerged that, for the time being at least, has sutured many lesions of the neo-liberal social logics of financialization. The operation of this fantasmatic logic, which assumes the possibility of recuperating the venture of financialization by restoring ‘prudent banking’, has facilitated a ‘cooling out’ of the masses. It seems that the fantasy of ‘no more bust, only boom’ continues to captivate all those who, most of all, ‘want their bubble back’ (The Guardian, 2009, 24 February)​[18]​, and thereby makes more palatable and likely the restoration of the social logics of financialization.


One key message of our paper, therefore, is that an awareness of the operation of political and fantasmatic logics is valuable in addressing and countering their reactionary force. Such awareness forms part of our preparation for wrestling with the confusions and complexities of crises when these occur. Many have claimed that an opportunity for radical reform was missed when the government and Bank of England bailed out and nationalized the banks. Our paper suggests that fantasmatic and political logics operated to impede alternative diagnoses and visions across a whole range of public fora that, potentially, could provide citizens with a language to make sense of the current state of affairs and contemplate a range of solutions which move us beyond ‘business as usual’. Marginalizing the political dimension of the neoliberal finance regime was no doubt facilitated economically by a combination of fiscal and monetary measures whose effect was to mitigate or, rather, postpone the social effects of the crisis (e.g. rising unemployment, cuts in services and benefits, etc). This leads us to believe that the effectiveness of such restorative logics will not be properly tested until these consequences gather momentum and their full impact is widely and deeply felt by sections of society, including a generation of (already rather disaffected) young people who face the prospect of precarious employment (at best), limited housing options and narrowed opportunities. Although the possibilities of an oppositional movement, modelled upon recent popular revolts against institutionalized inequalities, provides grounds for hope, in the form of exerting some meaningful democratic control over financial institutions, we are not Panglossians. We would opt rather for Gramsci’s motto of ‘pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will’. With this qualification, then, perhaps we could add one more column to our chart, entitled ‘Political Awakening’, or, the ‘Marks Strike Back’ (see Table 2).
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Exhibit 1 Neoliberalism and Financialization

Social logics of financialization assume that markets perform most efficiently when `freed’ from political interference (aka public accountability). It formed the central element of a neo-liberal remedy for the earlier crisis of `stagflation’ (a combination of stagnation and inflation) that stymied profitable growth in a number of advanced capitalist economies during the 1970s. Neo-liberalism took hold in the UK during the mid-1980s when, in the second term of the Thatcher administration, the `Big Bang’ of City de/reregulation resulted in the operation of financial markets and services becoming (further) insulated from political accountability and control. Restrictions on competition were eased and the emphasis was upon making London a more attractive (aka deregulated) environment for doing business. The expansion of the City continued during the Thatcher and Major administrations. When New Labour took office in 1997, Gordon Brown, Blair’s Chancellor, passed formal control over the bank rate from politicians to finance technocrats in the Bank of England in order to signal a willingness to insulate financial markets from political control and thereby turbo-charge the economy by making the City an off-shore island within the UK. `New Labour’s’ Faustian pact with the City funded its flagship social policy of poverty alleviation (e.g. minimum wage, tax credits) while it Private Finance Initiative (borrowing from the private sector to fund public infrastructure) later renewed public services (hospitals, education). Delivering these benefits through an expanded public sector inhibited closer scrutiny of how the seemingly endless boom was being constructed and sustained. The financialization of housing, in particular, became a central part of a ‘welfare trade-off’ during the period of the Clinton and Bush administrations, as well as under New Labour (Willmott, 2011), and this was key to ensuring economic prosperity and political stability in a situation where salary rises failed  to match consumer aspirations.

The Sunday Sun (12 April, 2009) gleefully reported how, in the best selling comic Viz, `Sir Fred has been turned into a Fat Cat and is described as a “Big Useless Lump” where his face is drawn on the body of an overweight feline.
He can be seen tucking into a feeding bowl full to the brim with pension cheques. But in the cartoon Sir Fred’s owner does what many RBS shareholders would like to do and takes away his pension. The banker is then forced to eek out a living by hunting down and feeding on mice.













^1	  These were later reported to be stuffed not with personal possessions but with food looted from the restaurants, a pillaged prize to be consumed with an ambivalent relish.
^2	  At a general level, an appeal to logics signals a degree of discomfort with the ‘causal law’ paradigm, the classical view that social phenomena can be subsumed under a general law in the same way that physical phenomena can be subsumed under a general causal law. The appeal to the term ‘logics’ registers a certain dissatisfaction with existing alternatives to the causal law paradigm. These are what have elsewhere been called ‘contextualized self-interpretations’ and ‘social mechanisms’ (see Glynos & Howarth 2007: 49-102). While social mechanisms are unsatisfactory because they do not abandon the ‘last vestiges of essentialism’ that characterize the causal law paradigm, contextualized self-interpretations push too far in the direction of a pure descriptivism. Logics seek to carve out a third position by recognizing the truth of the intuitions informing the two dominant responses to the causal law paradigm. For example, we accept the necessity of contextualizing the self-interpretations of relevant actors linked to financial practices. But we also accept that our understanding cannot be reduced to these contextualized self-interpretations: an appeal must be made, however implicit, to an underlying ontology, as well as a set of sociological assumptions and normative projections. This supplementary move, moreover, is understood in terms of a practice of articulation (Glynos & Howarth 2007: 165-208). At a general level, then, the sense and significance of logics emerges by way of contrast with causal laws, contextualized self-interpretations, and social mechanisms. As we will go on to see shortly a logics approach identifies more specific social, political and ideological processes (or logics) within distinct regimes of practice, of which the financial sector might comprise one.
^3	  This was triggered by a request to the Bank of England for a liquidity support facility due to problems encountered by Northern Rock in raising funds in the money market needed to replace maturing short-term capital market borrowings.
^4	  However, there is also the possibility of a certain mode of enjoyment/relation of subjects to fantasy that points towards an embrace of contingency and can therefore be understood as ‘ethical’ (Glynos, 2008).
^5	  This is the subtitle of Goffman’s (1952) ` On Cooling the Mark Out’
^6	  Here we rely upon Krippner’s (2005: 174) definition of financialization as ‘a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production’.
^7	  We are indebted to the anonymous reviewers for their astute observations and suggestions on this point. We note here too a potential, though we think fairly minor, discrepancy in the use we make of one of Goffman’s phase names, namely, the ‘squawk’ phase. While we have been faithful to the generalised use of this term as Goffman deploys it in outline form at the start of his article, we find that its more detailed specification later in the article diverges from the way we use it. Squawk, for Goffman, actually denotes a formal complaint by the mark to higher authorities, while it appears that allowing the mark to ‘blow his top off’ is considered more informal, and is not explicitly qualified as a ‘squawk’. We, on the other hand, consider both these aspects to be part of what we call the ‘squawk’ phase.  A related difference concerns the fact that the strategies listed by Goffman as examples outside the purview of the cooling phase are treated by us as part of the cooling phase.  For example, Goffman considers the marks’ squawking, committing a criminal offence against an operator, or indeed committing suicide to be instances falling outside the cooling phase. This certainly makes sense from the point of view of the operator who wishes the mark to attend to his or her wounded self-image without recourse to the authorities, but certainly not from the point of view of keeping at bay the contestability of the suspect norms of a neoliberal finance regime.
^8	 ! We allude here to the ‘capitalization of almost everything’ ranging from the securitization of the amount of beer drunk in a pub to the securitization of music royalties (see Leyshon and Thrift, 2007). At the centre of the boom was the structuring of income streams derived from mortgages into securities-and their re-securitization into CDOs (collateralized debt obligations). Aided in the US by the Community Reinvestment Act (see Willmott, 2011), sub-prime lending increased rapidly, with the effect that all property values rose steeply and seemingly unstoppably.
^9	  In an interview in the Daily Mail in September 2008, he sought to correct this statement by adding: 'I actually said, “No more Tory boom and bust”(...) Fifteen per cent interest rates under the Tories! We've got interest rates of five per cent, that's a bit different, isn't it?’ (The Daily Mail, 2008, 11 September).
^10	  It seems that investors, as well as regulators and politicians, had grown confident in their collective capacity to outmanoeuvre prospective crises by ever more sophisticated forms of risk management. Most professional investors, including senior bankers if they are to be believed, had unshakable confidence in the assumptions that informed the construction of mathematical models and design of financial instruments (e.g. use of the same baseline correlation assumption of 0.3 for mortgage-backed securities as for corporate debt which made them attractive for packaging into CDOs and what risks were being taken, such as  the packaging of riskier tranches of mortgage-backed securities into CDOs (see: MacKenzie, 2011).
^11	  Only in a minority of cases (e.g. Madoff’s Ponzi scheme) were the ‘marks’ victims of ‘planned illegal exploitation’ (Goffman, 1952: 451).
^12	  The phrase is taken from a statement made by Chuck Prince, CEO of what was then America’s biggest bank, Citigroup, in July 2007 when he said ‘When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance.’ 
^13	  Our analysis of UKFI is inspired by, and indebted to, Fround et al.’s (2010) insightful paper.
^14	  Noting the break from earlier more pluralist inquiries into finance (the Macmillan Committee of 1931 and the Wilson Committee of 1960 in which dissenting voices were heard and reported), the CRESC Alternative Report offers a very detailed breakdown and analysis of the membership of,  and witnesses called to, the Bischoff and Wigley reports (ibid: 22-27). `Bischoff group members’, it notes `collectively had 662 years of work experience and 75% of those years were spent in City occupations or servicing City needs. Wigley called expert witnesses but 90% of its witnesses came from finance or consultancy with revenue links to finance (CRESC, 2009: 5).
^15	  At the time of writing, of the nine UK press articles referring to UKFI since its creation, only one (Kay, 2008, 26 November) has questioned its priorities. Kay contends that `(t)he rationale of public ownership is that there is a strong public interest, not just in the financial returns from these activities, but in what these businesses do and how they operate’ It is precisely this concern that the shadowy form of UKFI and the appointment of its directors serves to suppress and circumvent.
^16	  We accept of course that a failure to intervene in the financial crisis, when bankers feared to lend to each other and the banking system seized up, would have resulted in unjustifiable disruption and misery. Not to attempt to mitigate the crisis by using, and continuing to inject, huge public funds in order to recapitalize the banks would have been the height of social irresponsibility. The critical (political) issue is, for us, not the defensibility of the bail out per se but, rather, the terms of the bail out and, more specifically, whether these terms incorporated a determination to ensure the future impossibility of this form of capitalist crisis, with its impacts upon welfare provision, employment and public services. Our concern is that the terms of the bail out have not incorporated any such determination. Instead, immediate pressures to revive the global banking system with the lubricant of public finance countermanded any substantive consideration of a quid pro quo beyond the opportunity of a future pay-back.
^17	  To find any sustained questioning of the restored ‘settlement’, it is necessary to turn to comparatively obscure academic papers, reports prepared by NGOs or to blogs (e.g. Copeland, 2010).
^18	  The paragraph from which this phrase is extracted is worth quoting in full: `Please can we have our bubble back, clamours just about everyone. The 70% who own homes and those who dashed into buy-to-let property yearn for the magical unearned wealth that came from nowhere. Most people will only judge that the slump is over on the day they see prices rise again in their local estate agent's windows. Normality returns at last! Everyone knows this fairy money caused the crisis, but since about 2003 real incomes have hardly risen, except among the top 10% of earners. House prices sustained the feelgood spending. Where, many economists ask nervously, is our growth to come from now if not in fantasy finance or property boom?’ (The Guardian, 2009, 24 February).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